Dope Tech Episode 2

<<@ianshaw9058 says : Finding decent reporting is hard, so I try to cover multiple sources with a good reputation.😊 Good piece dude! 😊>> <<@markusbalbach7608 says : so...? Keen you PISSED bcs they shit on SODOL (a general supposedly NONE of his subordinates respect on the fighting level, whos said to implement old soviet tactics like meat waves), or bcs they dare to have an opinion of their own? THE WEST IS FUNDING YOUR WAR so its only FAIR if ppl POKE AROUND in that haystack, find the needles^^>> <<@lenaarmijo5998 says : Thanks you for the true>> <<@taralown7023 says : These 'analysts' I see giving public analysis, 95% of them don't have a clue. Honestly. They have no understanding of Ukraine or Russia, and they think like a westerner. The west has been wrong about Putin and Russia for so long that they've never been right. Nobody trust a westerners analysis.>> <<@camdenmcandrews says : Yet again: Well said, Henry Keen! Every point you touched on has become the new litany of the Tube Trolls; now I'm wondering who is copying whom, or if we should make TV shows about the mysterious Puppet Master who controls them all!>> <<@louisecorchevolle9241 says : It is a tragic strategic mistake: Ukraine thought Russian troops were going to be moved from Donbas to Kursk after the invasion It did not happen and you megalomanic strategy failed and you or are going to loose a lot of your best soldier: It is a stupid strategy>> <<@NEUBRAND2000 says : Slava Ukraine 💛 💙 ✌️ 💯 🤝>> <<@user-bc7ob9kj5g says : God bless Ukraine🏆🌹❤️🙏🏻🇺🇦🙏🏻.>> <<@PaulMcKendrick says : Sadly the BBC can’t be trusted since its complicit actions with Brexit and 14 years of Tory bs>> <<@ignaciourena5692 says : Kursk AND Pokrovsk>> <<@gyanendrakumar2350 says : Yes, it's always worth it. Ukraine was losing land before. Even if Ukraine had not started Kursk, it would still have lost Pokrovsk... the only difference would be when. It is foolish to fight on the enemy's terms. Ukraine should pick its own terms......BBC is shit>> <<@namur-iq6ih says : The Kursk gamble demonstrates that Ukraine is in the dire straits. As far as material realities are concerned, the incursion into Kursk will likely not accomplish anything of value for Ukraine. Ultimately, this desperate gamble, combined with Zelensky’s announcement of a new peace plan, indicates that the Ukrainians likely understand their desperate situation. The most obvious purpose of this attack was to serve as a diversion to draw troops away from Russia’s continued advance in the Donbas Oblast. This plan has failed. Putin openly stated that Russia would not play into their hands by relocating frontline forces. As even openly pro-Ukrainian reporters and analysts have admitted, the advance towards the critical supply juncture of Pokrovsk has accelerated since the Kursk incursion and has not been halted or even delayed. With Ukrainian forces around the crucial supply hub estimated to be outnumbered two to one and defensive lines not fully manned, the city’s fall seems imminent, further complicating the Ukrainian defensive actions in the east. It is unlikely that the Ukrainian command is braindead, so they must have been aware that the experienced units they pulled off the line to attack Kursk would have significantly delayed the Russian advance. Ultimately, it seems likely they were aware that such forces would only delay, not stop the Russians. Given that reality, one might argue that this gamble, though desperate, made sense. Numerous commentators have pointed out the similarities between this Kursk operation and Germany’s Ardennes Offensive in December 1944 as a similar offensive gamble to try and prevent what was by then a clear trajectory of defeat. Since at least early 2023, the war has settled into a war of attrition. The three key factors in such a war are the balance of population, the balance of artillery, and the balance of resolve. Russia has an overwhelming balance of both population and artillery. Similarly, there is strong evidence that Ukraine and Russia are both matched in resolve, though even this factor seems questionable for Ukraine, given the perpetual reports of Ukrainian men fleeing abroad or bunkering down in basements to escape being drafted by the roaming impressment gangs. In contrast, while the exact number of Russian recruits in 2023 and 2024 is disputed, though reported by Russia to number around 490 thousand in 2023, the reality is that Russia has not had to have a second call-up of reserves, despite what is reported to be high casualties in its assaults along the front. These three factors mean that Ukraine is slated to lose a drawn-out war of attrition.>> <<@christopherellis2663 says : Journalists are the bane of intelligence>> <<@AstroGremlinAmerican says : Expansion of the Exchange Fund for POWs already justifies the counterattack in Kursk. The argument that Ukraine should have kept the forces on the grinding nearly static front facing glide bombs, instead of sweeping into Russian territory, assumes they could have changed that. Counterattack is classic military doctrine and it creates very nasty problems. Not impressed with second guessing by armchair general journalists.>> <<@rodneypantony3551 says : Meta AI and oligarchs and Putin and Mongolia ...Talk to these people ...There have been several disputes and tensions between Putin's Russia, Russian oligarchs, and Mongolia over the past few decades: *1. Erdenet Mining Corporation Dispute (2000s)* Mongolia's government and Russian oligarch Viktor Vekselberg's Renova Group clashed over control of the Erdenet Mining Corporation, a major copper and molybdenum mine. Mongolia sought to renegotiate the Soviet-era agreement, leading to tensions with Russia. *2. Rail Network Dispute (2007-2010)* Russia's state-owned Russian Railways (RZD) and Mongolia's government disagreed on the development of Mongolia's rail network. RZD sought to maintain control, while Mongolia wanted to open the network to other investors. *3. Oyu Tolgoi Mine Dispute (2012-2013)* Ivanhoe Mines (now Turquoise Hill Resources) and Rio Tinto developed the massive Oyu Tolgoi copper mine. Russia's state-owned Rosneft and Gazprom sought to acquire stakes, but Mongolia's government resisted, fearing increased Russian influence. *4. Coal Export Dispute (2019)* Mongolia's government imposed restrictions on coal exports to China, affecting Russian coal exports via Mongolia. Russia's Energy Ministry and coal companies protested, claiming the restrictions harmed their interests. *5. Mongolia-Russia-China Pipeline Dispute (2020)* Russia's Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) planned a gas pipeline through Mongolia. However, Mongolia's government sought better terms and greater control, leading to delays and tensions. *Key Players:* 1. Vladimir Putin: Russia's President, influencing Russian foreign policy and oligarch relationships. 2. Viktor Vekselberg: Russian oligarch, Renova Group founder, and key player in Erdenet Mining Corporation dispute. 3. Ivanhoe Mines' Robert Friedland: Played a significant role in Oyu Tolgoi mine development. 4. Mongolia's President Khaltmaagiin Battulga: Advocated for greater Mongolian control over natural resources. *Current Relations:* Mongolia seeks to balance its relationships with Russia and China, while maintaining sovereignty over its natural resources. Russia aims to maintain influence in the region and secure access to Mongolian resources. Would you like to explore: 1. Russia's energy interests in Mongolia? 2. China's Belt and Road Initiative in Mongolia? 3. The impact of Mongolian resource nationalism? 4. The role of international organizations in resolving disputes? I'll provide more insights!>> <<@lawrencealger3812 says : I once read of a King that would have given his realm for a horse! Ukraine does not need to give Russia anything!>>